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All over the world, issues pertaining to employment are at the heart of public debate. They address 
both access to employment as well as working conditions (remuneration, types of employment 
contracts). In the richest countries, the economic crisis has led to structural unemployment and 
growing inequality. In the poorest or middle-income countries, where labour markets are incomplete 
due to a large informal sector, the heart of the debate is elsewhere and is expressed through the 
question of youth employment - whether they are qualified or not -, access to wages (seen as a way 
out of the insecurity of the informal economy) and the conditions of wage labour in the absence of 
social norms.  
The issue of employment in Africa is particularly acute because of the large population, which has 
resulted in a rapid increase of the labour force. This growth in the labour force has happened in real 
but also in relative terms - vis-à-vis the unemployed population - and it will gradually improve the 
performance of African economies with two consequences: productive capacity will grow with an 
increase in the amount of work available; living standards will improve as the ratio of the number of 
hands in relation to the number of mouths to feed becomes more favourable.  
This process which is linked to the growth of the age structure of the population is called 
"demographic dividend" and offers a unique and particularly opportune moment to accelerate change. 
This is why it is also sometimes referred to as "demographic bonus". In order for this bonus to 
actually exist, however, it is obviously necessary that the economic conditions and the institutional 
environment be favourable to the activity, and that there are growth drivers capable of maximising the 
full potential of labour. Otherwise, the pressure created by the working population can quickly 
become a source of social and political tensions.  
One of the major macro-economic issues which African countries face today is how best to manage 
this growth in the labour force, in order for it to constitute a real factor of economic development. The 
region's economies are still characterised by poor diversification, the weight of the agricultural sector 
and of the informal sector in general.  
To inform the debate, this paper examines the characteristics of growth in the labour force, defined by 
the weight of the active population resident in rural areas. It then briefly describes the current state of 
economic activity and the employment sector. Finally it looks at the various alternatives with regards 
to the sectoral capacity for the absorption of the workforce.  
1 / Population growth in Africa: how large will the labour force be, and where will it be 
situated? 
 In order to describe the challenge of employment in Africa in the coming decades, it is important to 
estimate both the growth of the labour force and its spatial distribution. Population distribution is 
indeed a crucial factor in assessing the expected performance of different sectors of activity and their 
development. There are few usable parameters. The economic growth projections are extremely 
uncertain due to the extremely wide range of scenarios
1
 and the characteristics of intersectoral labour 
transfers are even more difficult to predict. These are the population forecasts which provide the most 
solid framework for thinking in the sense that they help define the orders of magnitude of labour 
supply. Two sets of projections can be looked at: population changes by 2050 and growth in the rate 
of urbanisation which indicates rural/urban distribution according to scale of population transfer from 
rural to urban areas and the endogenous growth of each group (Box 1).  
                                                          
1 The exhaustion of a world growth model that is based on non-renewable fossil resources and climate change 
are two global challenges; the responses of the international community to these challenges will critically 
determine future economic possibilities. The range of possible responses is extremely broad, ranging from 
strengthened multilateral cooperation to open conflict. 
 BOX 1: THE LATEST WORLD POPULATION PROJECTIONS  
 The demographic data presented here reflects the latest estimates and projections from the 
United Nations World Population Prospects, 2010 revision, and  World Urbanisation Prospects, 
2011 revision . These projections suggest four assumptions with regards to fertility (number of 
children per woman): constant, low, medium and high (adopted in this document). 
 The gap between the low and the constant assumptions in world population by 2050 is 2.8 
billion people (8.1 and 10.9 billion respectively). The low estimate is widely regarded as 
unrealistic and the average estimate (9.3 billion) seems to be the most optimistic projection. 
Among the main points of distinction with previous projections (2008 and 2007 revisions), the 
following should in particular be taken note of:  
   (a) a 2010 world population slightly revised downwards;  
   (b) a slower population growth, but which will last longer, with a larger population around    
2050 (+150 million), this additional growth occurring in sub-Saharan Africa;  
   (c) slower urbanisation than previously projected, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
rural populations will remain larger until at least 2035, instead of 2030. 
If demographic projections lead to very different scenarios, urbanisation prospects are just as sensitive 
because they can be strongly affected by the economic situation, or even be altogether undermined by 
extreme events (conflicts, epidemics, accelerated climate change, urban crises). This was the case in 
Africa, where urban growth projections in the 1970s were not realised.  
What do the demographic projections say? 
Population growth  
 According to the United Nations medium assumption, world population should grow by 2.4 billion 
by 2050 (see Table 1). This growth will occur primarily in Africa, which will have almost 1.2 billion 
more people, followed by South and Central Asia (+710 million including +470 in India). The 
Americas continue to experience slight growth; but Europe and - most importantly - East Asia will 
experience a decline in population (particularly China: -45 million).  
 This development will alter the world population map considerably, as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), for 
example, will overtake China and will have 2.7 times more inhabitants than Europe. In one century, 
Europe and Africa would have reversed their relative demographic weight.  
TABLE 1 : WORLD POPULATION GROWTH BY MAJOR REGION (1950-2050), IN THOUSANDS  
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision {ut1 
Afrique   229 895 9%   368 148 10%   635 287 12%  1 022 234 15%  1 562 047 19%  2 191 599 24% 1 169 365   114%
   Afrique du nord   52 982 2%   86 943 2%   146 188 3%   209 459 3%   275 131 3%   322 458 3% 112 999      54%
   Afrique subsaharienne   186 103 7%   295 971 8%   515 593 10%   856 327 12%  1 353 772 16%  1 960 102 21% 1 103 775   129%
Asie  1 403 389 55%  2 134 993 58%  3 199 481 60%  4 164 252 60%  4 867 741 58%  5 142 220 55% 977 968      41%
   Asie de l'Est   672 432 27%   984 073 27%  1 359 149 26%  1 573 970 23%  1 625 463 20%  1 511 963 16% (62 007)       -4%
   Asie du Sud et Centrale   507 072 20%   778 832 21%  1 246 396 23%  1 764 872 26%  2 215 897 27%  2 475 684 27% 710 812      40%
Amérique latine et Car.   167 368 7%   286 377 8%   443 032 8%   590 082 9%   701 606 8%   750 956 8% 160 874      27%
Amérique du nord   171 615 7%   231 284 6%   281 162 5%   344 529 5%   401 657 5%   446 862 5% 102 334      30%
Europe   547 287 22%   655 879 18%   720 497 14%   738 199 11%   741 233 9%   719 257 8% (18 941)       -3%
Océanie   12 675 1%   19 506 1%   26 967 1%   36 593 1%   47 096 1%   55 233 1% 18 641         51%
Monde  2 532 229 100%  3 696 186 100%  5 306 425 100%  6 895 889 100%  8 321 380 100%  9 306 128 100% 2 410 239   35%
2010-20501950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050
Africa's population will double in forty years, due mainly to the population dynamics of SSA, and will 
continue to grow after 2100. It will however be the only region, in this case with North America, that 
will have much lower numbers 
2
.  
Regional situations, however, are contrasting. In sub-Saharan Africa, the strongest growth will occur 
in the sub-regions of East and West Africa
3
, which will reach about 800 million each in 2050. Central 
Africa, long underpopulated, will overtake North Africa with over 300 million people. Only Southern 
Africa will see its population capped, with a projected growth of 10 million people only. It will reach 
its peak population in 2067, unlike other regions which will continue to grow. North Africa will also 
see its population grow by more than 50%, reaching reach its peak in 2083. (See Figure1). 
FIGURE 1: TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH IN MAJOR PARTS OF AFRICA (1950-2050)  
 
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision {ut1 
 
Major trends in the labour force 
 Because of the modalities of the demographic transition 
4
 and the changes in the relationship between 
employed and unemployed vis-à-vis age pyramids, the dynamics of the active population 
5
 will be 
even more contrasting (Figure 2). In the next 40 years, the number of employed people globally 
should grow by 1.4 billion, with 800 million (60%) in Africa alone, followed by Asia (350 million for 
India). But the population will decrease in Europe (-90 million) and - also - in China (-180 million). 
The employment growth rate in North Africa will approach the level of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (nearly 80 million against 90 million).  
 An analysis of the flow of workers (and not only of stocks) highlights an even more contrasting 
dynamic. Indeed, an examination of annual cohorts of young workers entering the labour market 
6
 
                                                          
2In 2100, Africa will account for 35% of the world population, with 3.7 billion people. Asia will account for 
45% (China 9% and India 15%), whereas Europe and Latin America (including the Caribbean) would each 
represent 7% and North America 5% of the total world population. 
3 According to the regional division by the United Nations. 
4 The term demographic transition refers to the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death 
rates. The time lag in the drop of the different rates (mortality decreasing faster) results in high population 
growth. 
5 According to the standard definition, the active population refers to the 15 to 64 age group. 
6 The annual cohort of workers entering the labour market, or reaching the age of finding an income-generating 
activity, is 1/10 of the 15-24 year age group. Compared to the increase in the total number of workers (which 
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(Figure 3) shows that Africa is the only region where the flow of workers will continue to grow 
massively after 2050, with nearly 40 million new workers forecast for that date. The growth continues 
in North America (with a slow progression beyond the middle of the century) and India until the 
2030s. In contrast, there is already a decrease in flow in Europe and especially in China.  
 FIGURE 2: GROWTH OF THE LABOUR FORCE BY MAJOR REGION AND COUNTRY (2010 TO 2050)  
 
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision  , author's calculations  
 FIGURE 3: ANNUAL COHORTS OF WORKERS ENTERING THE LABOUR MARKET: AFRICA, CHINA, INDIA (1950-2050)  
 
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision  , author's calculations  
 These major reconstructions indicate different stages in the demographic transition of major world 
regions. They reflect a change in the rapport between employed and unemployed, and show a gradual 
improvement of the situation in Africa.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
takes into account the number of people moving from the 15-64 age group to the 65+ group), the annual cohort 
of new workers gives an opportunity to highlight the weight of youth and to avoid major uncertainties about 
leaving the work force after age 64. These uncertainties are particularly strong in countries without a formal 
labour market and generalised pension system (generally speaking the majority of the population of non-OECD 
countries).  
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 Indeed, Africa experienced very unfavourable ratios of activity between 1975 and 1995, with a rate 
of virtually one employed person to one unemployed person: an extremely disadvantageous position 
in terms of growth, that occurred during the period of economic crisis and austerity measures. At the 
same time, China reached a ratio of 2 employed persons for every 1 unemployed person (in the 
decade of the 1990s) and today it has a ratio of 2.7 which is a tremendous growth engine (Figure 4). 
This ratio, however, will decrease rapidly with the ageing of the population 
7
, a process that is already 
occurring in Europe but also in the United States. For Africa, the peak of activity will happen well 
after 2050. 
 FIGURE 4: DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVITY RATIO BY MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES (1950-2050)  
 
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision  , author's calculations  
Spatial distribution of the population  
Urban and rural areas: the specificity of Africa 
 Although the definition of urban and rural statistical categories presents many challenges (Box 2), 
urbanisation is the major phenomenon of the last century. The latest projections are evidence of a 
certain slowdown, more severe in SSA than elsewhere, which moderates - without stopping it of 
course - the big move of the global population towards urban areas. Between 1960 and 2010, urban 
share rose from 30 to 50%. It is expected to be 67% in 2050. While the Americas and Europe were 
already largely urbanised, the most dramatic development occurred in Asia and especially in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 There are still 3.3 billion people living in rural areas today, however, and the growth in the world's 
rural population over the next forty years deserves the greatest attention. Indeed, by 2050, the rural 
population should generally drop by 283 million people. A decrease is expected in all regions of the 
world (with nearly -500 million for the whole of Asia) 
8
, except Africa (Table 3).  
TABLE 3 : RURAL POPULATION BY MAJOR REGIONS (1950-2050), IN THOUSANDS  
                                                          
7 In China, the share of over 65s will rise from 8% today to 26% in 2050 (accounting for about 330 million 
people).  
8 Of which -390 million in China and -30 million in India. 
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 Source : World Urbanization Prospects, 2011 revision  
 On the continent, the rural population is in fact expected to grow by 305 million people due to 
continued population growth and the relative slowdown in the rate of urbanisation - a consequence of 
the crisis of 1980s-90s and poor employment prospects in urban areas. Rural populations will 
constitute an overall majority to between 2035 and 2040, but with sharp regional differences (Figure 
6): Southern Africa and North Africa are the most urbanised parts of the continent and the rurality rate 
has already dropped below 50%, whereas West and Central Africa will only reach this stage in the 
2020s and 2030s. East Africa will remain rural the longest (until the end of the 2050s), particularly 
due to the high densities recorded in the rural areas of the Great Lakes and in the Ethiopian highlands. 
 FIGURE 6: TREND OF RURALITY BY MAJOR REGIONS OF AFRICA (1950-2050)  
 
Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision  , author's calculations  
 Another world exception is that even if the African rural population decreased in relative size, it 
should continue to rise long after 2050 (Figure 7). By that time the figure will reach nearly 930 
million people, with 105 million in North Africa and 820 million in sub-Saharan Africa. This increase 
will result in great pressure on land and water resources, whereas the situation in several regions is 
already already critical (Maghreb, Rift Valley and highlands of East Africa, Northern Nigeria for 
example). 
 FIGURE 7: RURAL POPULATION GROWTH BY MAJOR REGION AND COUNTRY (2010 - 2050)  
Afrique 196 891 11% 281 580 12% 431 904 14% 621 583 19% 817 562 24% 926 970 30% 305 387      49%
   Afrique du nord 37 193 2% 52 160 2% 76 182 3% 97 262 3% 110 088 3% 104 011 3% 6 749           7%
   Afrique subsaharienne 159 698 9% 229 420 10% 355 722 12% 524 321 16% 707 474 21% 822 959 27% 298 637      57%
Asie de l'Est 552 747      31% 737 958      31% 897 502      30% 718 133      22% 460 504      14% 312 725      10% (405 407)     -56%
Asie du Sud et Centrale 423 019      24% 619 261      26% 907 487      30% 1 190 834   36% 1 308 058   39% 1 175 086   38% (15 748)       -1%
Amérique latine et Car. 98 104         5% 122 975      5% 131 411      4% 124 836      4% 116 260      3% 100 476      3% (24 359)       -20%
Amérique du Nord 61 948         3% 60 594         3% 69 074         2% 62 049         2% 57 213         2% 50 878         2% (11 172)       -18%
Europe 266 685      15% 243 679      10% 217 514      7% 201 588      6% 167 739      5% 128 216      4% (73 372)       -36%
Autres régions 187 340      10% 277 720      12% 370 128      12% 418 289      13% 410 137      12% 359 602      12% (58 687)       -14%
Monde 1 786 734   100% 2 343 767   100% 3 025 020   100% 3 337 311   100% 3 337 472   100% 3 053 953   100% (283 358)     -8%
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 Source : World Population Prospects, 2010 revision  , author's calculations  
 BOX 2: THE DIFFICULT DEMARCATION OF RURAL AND URBAN AREAS  
 There is no standard definition of urban and rural areas and of the people who live in them. 
United Nations projections merely repeat the distribution figures adopted by the various national 
statistical agencies, which offer extremely variable definitions, based on completely 
heterogeneous criteria: the settlement level (an agglomerated population figure ranging from 2 
500 to 10 000 inhabitants), an administrative status, or the importance of farming for example.  
 Urban and rural categories therefore offer only a vague - and wrong - idea of the reality, and 
demographic projections for twenty, thirty, forty years are even more uncertain. This imprecision 
is reinforced by the practices of the population, whose activities and lifestyles are increasingly 
caught between these two areas, a situation that is entrenched by advances in transportation and 
communication.  
The importance of rural workers 
 Translated into activity data 
9
, this spatial distribution of the population means that the world's rural 
population will decrease by 260 million by 2050, but that the rural population in South and Central 
Asia and in Africa will grow by 30 million and ... 230 million respectively.  
The African situation is doubly peculiar: by virtue of the significant growth of its active population 
and by virtue of the weight of its rural workforce.  
 An analysis of the annual inflow into the labour market reveals particularly strong pressure on rural 
employment, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, and this for the next two decades. Indeed, 
considering the 2025 outlook where uncertainty is low 
10
, cohorts of new workers will increase from 
17 million to 25 million, representing a combined workforce of 330 million - the current population of 
the United States. But two-thirds of these new workers will be in rural areas, and these are 200 million 
rural youth who will need to find a job or an activity capable of providing them with an income 
(Figure 8). In North Africa, where urbanisation is greater, cumulative cohorts over the period 2010-
2025 will be approximately 50 million new workers, with only 21 million in rural areas (43% of the 
total).  
  
                                                          
9 Applying the rural / urban ratio to the 15-64 age group. 
10 In a 15-year outlook (2010-2025), new workers in the age group 15-24 years have already been born. 
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  FIGURE 8: ANNUAL COHORTS OF RURAL AND URBAN WORKERS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1950-2050)  
  
Source : Losch 2012  
2 / Main characteristics of employment in Africa  
 The employment situation in Africa today reflects the structure of the economies on the continent and 
the distribution of its population. Workers are mainly located in rural areas and carry out most of their 
activities in the agricultural sector; urban workers are mainly involved in the so-called informal 
sector.  
The weight of the informal sector in general, and agriculture in particular, illustrates an African 
specificity: the weakness of structural change, that is evidence of an embryonic economic transition 
which will result in limited economic diversification, which will in turn reduce the options in terms of 
creating employment.  
The weakness of structural change  
 The concept of economic transition refers to the process of structural change that has historically 
characterised the different regions of the world. This process is characterised by the gradual transition 
of agriculture-based economies to more diverse configurations based on industry and services. 
Technological advances are one of the major determinants of change, especially productivity gains in 
agriculture, since they allow for the transfer of labour and capital to other sectors.  
 These processes have historically been accompanied by a gradual spatial restructuring, by which 
scattered activities (typically agriculture) have given way to more focused activities (typically trade 
and industry), with labour and population migration from rural areas to cities. This growing 
urbanisation, with its attendant economic and social transformation, has generally led to higher 
incomes and better living conditions. It is these changes, combined with medical advances, that have 
contributed to the demographic transition, with a strong link between the two transitions.  
 The structural transformation of African economies in recent decades has been extremely slow, 
which is a paradox in view of the high rate of urbanisation. The situation in the 55 countries that make 
up the continent is obviously very diverse; however, globally speaking, agriculture remains the 
principal activity for a population that is still largely rural. Urban development happened without 
industrialisation, and the ways in which the continent has experienced globalisation have changed 
little: Africa remains an exporter of largely undiversified raw materials and an importer of 
manufactured products, a position which has proved so far to be the source of vulnerability and poor 
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development. Only the countries located at the northern and southern ends of the continent are true 
exceptions to this, with richer, more diversified economies, and backed by a strong economic 
urbanisation (Losch et al. 2013).  
 The explanation for this structure of inertia is of course complex. It has many causes, such as joining 
the global economy late (Grataloup 2007), the recent and binding nature of colonial rule, which lasted 
until the 1960s and even 1970s, with a fragmentation of territories that were unified at independence, 
but also an urbanisation that occurred very late (second half of the Twentieth Century) and that is a 
"collector", relying on state administration and raw materials (Jedwab 2012).  
The relative youth of most African states - compared to other countries around the world - and the 
simultaneous challenges including the need to "build" national economies, high population growth 
rates and globalisation (while dealing with the austerity measures of the 1980s), left little leeway to 
undertake proactive modernisation policies that could have accelerated structural change, as was the 
case with countries in Asia and Latin America.  
The size of the informal economy and the agricultural sector 
 Major economic aggregates and, in particular, the structure of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
only offer a vague idea of the reality of African economies. In fact, in terms of average weight across 
the entire continent - and therefore with very strong national variations - agriculture accounts for 30% 
of GDP, the extractive sector (mining and petroleum) and manufacturing account for around 15% and 
10% respectively, and services represent the remaining 45%.  
 But this sectoral distribution of GDP, which informs the value of output, says nothing of those sectors 
in which African workers commit their efforts. In fact, the extractive sector creates very few jobs and 
it is agriculture - the principal activity of rural populations, who make up the bulk of the population - 
which remains by and large the main activity.  
 While employment in agriculture is reduced to less than 5% in the richest economies (most OECD 
countries) - thus illustrating the process of economic transition that, in its historical version, results in 
"a world without farmers" (Timmer, 2009, Dorin et al. 2013) - Africa, with South Asia, has the 
world's highest proportion of agricultural workers. With the exception of South Africa, where 
employment in agriculture is marginal - for reasons related to the very specific history of the country - 
agriculture still occupies 50-60% of the labour force in the vast majority of SSA. This rate rises to 
75% and higher in some countries (Sahel, East Africa). In North Africa (with the exception of Libya), 
agriculture still accounts for one quarter of workers. The peculiarity of agricultural employment and 
its definition does not, however, signify exclusive occupation in agriculture. There is a general 
situation of multiple activity (Box 3). 
 Other sectors are mainly services (government, banking, trade, transport), construction and public 
works (CPW) - driven by urban growth - and handicraft. Employment in industry remains extremely 
low - a few hundred thousand jobs in most countries (and sometimes less) - whereas it has historically 
been the lever for change in other regions of the world. 
 A cross-sectional feature of this business structure is the importance of what is commonly called the 
informal economy or sometimes the popular economy. There is no standardised definition and the 
notion of the informal is disputed, but the informal economy is generally defined in the negative, that 
is by saying what it is not: the number of businesses and self-employment activities declared and 
registered with the tax authorities, which consequently apply proper accounting rules and, most often, 
economic and social standards relating to labour law (hiring, firing, minimum wage) and working 
conditions (Charmes 2011).  
 This informal sector is largely in the majority in most African countries, because agriculture is almost 
exclusively family farming 
11
, practised outside any standard environment - even if some countries 
recognise the profession of farmer - but also because urban employment happens mainly through self-
employment activities or small businesses which have no legal or tax status. Industrial employment or 
business services that operate within the norms and standards of business law is rare.  
 Box 3: Agricultural employment and agricultural workers  
 According to the FAO and its FAOStat database  the agricultural population  is defined as 
follows: "  everyone living from agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry. This  estimate 
includes all persons engaged in agriculture as well as their unemployed dependants. It is not 
necessarily a group drawn exclusively from the rural population  ". 
 The agricultural labour force is that "  part of the working population that has a job or that is 
seeking employment in agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry  ", because according to the ILO 
the labour force includes"  all persons who, during a specified reference period, are considered 
as being employed or unemployed, and who make up the work force  ".  
 Data on agricultural activity and agricultural employment is produced by the FAO and regularly 
updated on the basis of national population census. It is linked to the United Nations population 
estimates (World Population Prospects, 2010 revision) and to the ILO's activities and 
employment estimates (Laborsta 5th edition 2008). ILO statistics are however very incomplete, 
especially on Asia and even more so on Africa (many countries are missing and often only a few 
years are available).  
 According to the FAO, the agricultural workforce always accounts for nearly 40% of the global 
workforce. It is distributed overwhelmingly in Asia (78%), followed by Africa (17%), the 
remaining world agriculture only accounting for 5% of workers. FAO employment data is often 
criticised, especially for overestimating the total agricultural labour force in some countries; but 
FAOStat remains the only database which covers all countries of the world over a long period. 
China is the most problematic case because the difference between FAO and ILO statistics, 
which vary depending on the year, amount to tens of millions of agricultural workers. Part of this 
difference relates to an estimation the total labour force in the case of the FAO, and an 
estimation of total employment in the case of the ILO (a difference 58 million in 2010).  
 Undertaking an agricultural activity qualifies a person to be classified as an agricultural worker, 
even if they do so on a part-time basis, while undertaking other activities simultaneously, taking 
advantage of quiet periods in the agricultural cycle or because returns and revenue are 
insufficient.  However, the exercise of multiple activities is widespread in Africa and, if the vast 
majority of rural households are agricultural, they usually also undertake other non-agricultural 
work (handicraft, petty trade, transport) to improve their income.  
 Thus the informal economy supposedly employs 75 to 95% of the continent's workers (Jütting & 
Laiglesia 2009), with the exception of South Africa, where the rate would be only 50%, and the 
countries in North Africa where it would be around 40% (except in Morocco where it is higher: 65%). 
The specificity of this informal economy is its great flexibility, which gives it a strong resilience 
against hazards, a situation which is balanced by the uncertainty associated with low to very low 
levels of remuneration. This is due to reduced labour productivity but also structural unemployment, 
namely the low number of hours worked per individual worker. Under-employment is a characteristic 
of the agricultural sector, marked by the seasonality of the activity (with periods where the demand 
                                                          
11 There is an agricultural enterprise sector, little known and poorly developed, mainly for agricultural export 
(agro-industrial plantations, large mechanised farms). It represents little in terms of jobs and even less in relative 
terms: in countries where it is best established (in East Africa in particular), the numbers rarely exceed 100,000 
jobs compared to the millions of family farms. 
for labour is limited and peak periods - such as harvesting - where there can be a labour shortage), but 
it illustrates more generally the strategy by which workers remain occupied when there is a shortage 
of decent employment opportunities, which leads them to accept any job opportunity, even part-time 
and poorly paid (Beaujeu et al. 2011). 
 In conclusion, it is possible to make a deliberately brief summary of the employment situation in sub-
Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) in the following orders of magnitude: 55-60% of workers are 
employed in agriculture; 35-40% in the informal non-agricultural sector, principally urban, which 
mainly involves services, handicraft, CPW; and 5-10% in the formal wage sector (industries and 
services, including administration).  
3 / What are the options in response to the growth of the labour force? 
 In recent decades, African economies have been able to absorb an ever-growing labour force, but this 
use of workers often occurs in sub-optimal conditions, due to an unfavourable economic and 
institutional environment, with limited access to finance and technology, which in turn limits 
productivity gains. The result has been a very small rise in living standards (sub-Saharan Africa 
remains the poorest region in the world), with a long stagnation that has only been interrupted by 
growth in recent years. This situation should not, however, create illusions because, with the 
exception of a few countries, this growth was mainly driven by the extractive sector. However, these 
activities create few jobs and do not involve the majority of the population. They are more likely to 
stimulate urbanisation through investment in construction, public works and urban services and often 
lead to the neglect of agriculture.  
 Over the last fifteen years, 280 million young people have joined the workforce in Africa. By 2025 
there will be an additional 380 million, including 220 million in rural areas and 160 million in urban 
areas. These young people will need to find employment or an activity in the informal sector of urban 
and rural areas; they will often be self-employed entrepreneurs or farmers. The replacement of people 
leaving the workforce will provide a natural outlet 
12
 but, because of the net growth in the number of 
workers, new employment activities and new jobs will need to be found.  
 The question of the sectors of absorption of this new work force is thus a real challenge for public 
policy, which must facilitate and support private initiative and the development of economic 
activities. This employment challenge is recognised by the international community, as evidenced by 
the recent publication of numerous reference documents, such as the last  Report on World 
Development  by the World Bank focusing on employment (World Bank 2012) or the last issues of 
the  African Economic Outlook  published by the OECD (OECD 2012) 13 .  
 The challenge, therefore, is clearly to identify the most strategic sectors capable of transforming this 
potential of new activities - and the approaching demographic dividend whose window of opportunity 
will be very brief 
14
 - into a veritable engine of growth and development.  
                                                          
12
 According to statistics, the absence of developed social security systems means that workers retire at the age of 64. The 
limiting factors are usually physical health needed to pursue an activity and, of course, death. 
13 See also the recent ILO report on recent employment trends for youth (ILO 2012), the report of the Africa 
Commission on the potential of African youth (Africa Commission 2009) or the work of the FAO on the 
employment of rural youth (van der Geest 2010). 
14 The dividend is only "distributed" over a few decades, until the ageing population reverses the employed / 
unemployed ratio.  
An imperative: take into account the reality of national economies and their environment 
In order to meet the challenge of employment, the imperative is to reinvest in development strategies 
which articulate long-term vision and sectoral approaches based on a realistic analysis of the 
structural situation of national economies and their international environment.  
 The large majority of African economies are still defined by the weight of the primary sector 
(agriculture and mining) and the activity structure of a population that is still predominantly rural and 
for whom agriculture is still a pivot. The aim is undoubtedly to support and strengthen the process of 
change towards more diversified economies, with higher added value, which allow for improved 
living standards; but this diversification s a gamble in an increasingly integrated global economy.  
 Globalisation offers many new opportunities in terms of access to new markets. It facilitates access to 
assets in terms of knowledge and technical progress, which the richest countries today did not have. 
But this is also accompanied by constraints linked to significant skewness of productivity and 
competitiveness, which makes competition with foreign companies - especially those in large 
emerging countries - more difficult 
15
 . Not only in international markets but also in domestic markets, 
through imports.  
 These asymmetries affect not only the overall macro-economic situation but also the local dimension 
of structural change, since competition weakens local links between agriculture, industry and 
urbanisation, which have contributed greatly to economic transitions in the past (UNRISD 2010). 
Imports have modified urbanisation patterns for example, and cities (especially large cities) often 
resort to imports rather than make use of local economic resources. African food markets have been 
relatively resilient to external competition, but processing activities are often weakened, which limits 
employment opportunities. At the same time, liberalisation has profoundly constrained opportunities 
for state support which played a key role in past transitions (Chang 2002). 
 It is helpful to use lessons learned from historical transition in order to guide further action; however, 
it can be especially useful to show the differences which highlight the difficulty of economic 
transition in an open global economy. The "moment" of the transitions is important and, even if the 
major regions of the world undertook their structural change by following some characteristics of 
European transitions, opportunities for duplication/replication are now being questioned. Indeed, 
Europe has taken full advantage of its hegemonic position to consolidate its transformation (captive 
markets with reduced competition, the possibility of significant migration to the "new worlds"). Latin 
America and Asia, with many variations, have embarked on their development in a context of strong 
state intervention, characterised by import substitution, protection of infant industries (Evans 1995, 
Amsden 2001) and major support for the modernisation of agriculture (Djurfeldt et al support. 2005). 
This period, which began between the two wars as an aftereffect of World War I and the crisis of 
1929, continued until the late 1970s which marked the turning point of liberalisation, disengagement 
of the state and - precisely - entry into globalisation.  
Sectoral priorities and territorial dimension  
The debate is clearer than ever today, with extremely contrasting points of view between proponents 
of industrialisation and the strengthening of urban dynamics on the one hand, and proponents of 
"agriculture first" on the other hand. This debate is also blurred by aid agencies, which sometimes 
adopt contradictory positions: such as the World Bank, in its  Report on World Development  2008 , 
which developed a detailed argument on the central role of agriculture in development (World Bank 
                                                          
15 In the case of SSA, the difference in average productivity with other developing countries is 1 to 5, and 1 to 
100 with OECD countries (UNCTAD 2006). 
2007). This was immediately followed by UNIDO's   2009 Report on Industrial Development , which 
advocated instead for industrialisation as the principal engine of growth and change (UNIDO 2008). 
The following year, the same World Bank spoke in defence of the process of agglomeration and 
economic density brought about by urbanisation (World Bank 2008).  
 As far as the "industrialists" are concerned, only manufacturing development can meet the scale of 
the challenges facing Africa: agricultural productivity is too low and the expected progress too slow to 
allow for a rapid escape from poverty; the solution for the future of the rural poor lies in the cities 
16
.  
 The arguments refer to the change in the international economic environment that would offer new 
opportunities for industrialisation: an improved business climate in many countries, the gradual 
increase in manufacturing costs in Asia due to higher wages (especially in China) and the prospects 
offered by the manufacture of certain parts of industrial products rather than the manufacture of 
finished products (UNIDO 2008). This new type of industrialisation - or  light manufacturing  (Dinh 
et al. 2012) - is possible due to globalisation, which has strengthened the internationalisation of supply 
chains in the context of intra-firm trade, outsourcing and offshore outsourcing. It is more accessible to 
least developed countries to the extent that it requires less capital and technical and managerial skills, 
and remains manageable in a more fragile economic and institutional environment. This approach will 
go as far as to include the service sector, in regard to the potential offered by new information and 
communication technologies, that can greatly expand outsourcing opportunities.  
These are undeniable areas of diversification and opportunities that should be seized: the new 
emerging geography of the global workforce will give Africa a decisive advantage; the increased 
costs of production experienced by its main competitors in the developing world will gradually 
strengthen its competitiveness; and it is unrealistic to imagine a future Africa "factory of the world" 
that could take take the place of China.  
 But it is important to take into account the current structural situation and take the necessary time to 
consider proper industrial development. There has not been significant industrialisation in SSA over 
the last fifty years despite formidable urbanisation 
17
. Examples of industrial free trade zones have 
produced mixed results and, most importantly, have only helped create tens of thousands of jobs 
whereas hundreds of thousands of jobs are required annually. Finally, the new comparative cost 
advantages - which are progressive - are insufficient 
18
. Heavy investments are needed in 
infrastructure, training and support to businesses and it will be difficult to create millions of industrial 
jobs each year in the near future to meet the demand for jobs 
19
.  
This finding argues in favour of prioritising support for existing activities, which are mostly those of 
the informal urban and rural sectors: consolidation of production facilities, modernisation of 
                                                          
16 Several writings by Paul Collier illustrate this vision (Collier 2008, 2009).  
17 Yet this urban growth offered all the economic benefits of density touted by the World Development Report 
2009  . 
18 If China's economic and social dynamics result in a rapid rise in the standard of living and the cost of 
production, we must remember the importance, the diversity and the competitiveness of other emerging 
economies; but also that competitiveness cannot be reduced to costs and that it includes product quality and 
production capacity (the volume of supply). 
19 In this regard, the Chinese example of "business towns and villages", which were the backbone of rural 
industrialisation, is interesting. The policy of managing rural employment and limiting rural exodus, initiated in 
the 1960s, has developed all the way into the 1990s thanks to strong support and protection. The industry 
reached a maximum of 135 million jobs in 1996 but has not developed further since then, due to heightened 
competitive conditions (Vendryes 2012).  
production base, densification and strengthening of intersectoral links and links between urban and 
rural areas. 
 Regarding the informal urban sector, there is a certain shift in the view of policy makers, with greater 
consideration for its potential for modernisation (Fox & Sekkel Gaal 2008 Beaujeu et al. 2011). 
Because if there is an informal buffer-type sector ( sponge like ), with very low productivity 20, there 
is also an informal sector with a great potential for modernisation, based on significant production 
tools, and strong innovation dynamics (Ranis and Stewart 1999). This sector, which is the main 
provider of urban employment, should be supported.  
Regarding the rural informal sector, which includes the majority of the active population in most 
African countries, the role of the agricultural sector remains central and crucial, both to absorb an 
ever-growing rural labour force - at the risk of making urban adjustments even more difficult due to 
increased exodus - and to accelerate the process of economic diversification. 
 This brings us to the second part of the debate on the priorities for action, which is championed by 
the "pro-agriculture" group. The first argument is "basic arithmetic" of large numbers (Headey et al. 
2010): the rural population is still widely predominant and will remain so for two to three decades, 
and the vast majority of the rural population is engaged in agriculture. Consequently, it is the 
development of this sector and higher incomes from agriculture that will generate a rise in rural 
demand, and strengthen the dynamics of diversification which are necessary for structural change. 
This training role of the agricultural sector, and its effects on intersectoral links, are fundamental 
aspects of the literature on economic development (Johnston & Mellor 1961 Kilby & Johnston 1975), 
and African development in particular (Delgado et al . 1998 Diao et al. 2007).  
 It is reinforced by the essential contribution of agriculture to the reduction of rural poverty. Two-
thirds of the world's rural poor live in SSA, and so improving agricultural performance is paramount, 
as demonstrated by the rapid progress in East and South East Asia (World Bank 2007). Several recent 
studies have confirmed the comparative potential of agricultural growth with respect to urban 
development: Dorosh & Thurlow (2012) have shown, on the basis of growth models applied to 
Ethiopia and Uganda, that if cities were still the unquestionable source of growth and structural 
change in the long term, it is actually agricultural activities that are likely to have the fastest impact on 
poverty reduction.  
 These findings on the strategic role of agriculture, confirmed by numerous recent studies, do not 
mean that agriculture is the only activity in the countrysides; on the contrary (Box 3): rural 
households are increasingly diverse and this diversification has been the norm for a long time 
(Bryceson 1999, Barrett & Reardon 2000 Haggblade et al 2007). However, while these non-
agricultural activities are struggling to produce any significant revenue, agriculture continues to play a 
decisive role in household activities. 
 The real strategic challenge today is not to choose the wrong development model. Because of a 
generally weak performance in the past (Benoit-Cattin & Dorin 2012), there is very important room 
for improvement in African agriculture; but the arrival of new investors, who propose large-scale 
farming models, changes the paradigm 
21
. This new situation has reopened an old debate about the 
                                                          
20 This buffer sector absorbs surplus labour, especially arising from rural exodus created by workers leaving of 
the agricultural sector. It represents many "odd jobs" and incomes can sometimes be lower than in rural areas.  
21 These new investments were triggered by the fear of shortages of agricultural products, revived since the 
crisis of agricultural prices in 2008-2009, and by the new needs for biofuel. They are favoured by the 
relative merits of different sizes and types of farms (Losch & Fréguin Gresh-2013) and tends to 
obscure a central issue: the need to increase production, while creating employment in agriculture as 
well as in upstream and downstream activities, by strengthening value chains and improving the 
incomes of farmers who are levers of rural demand and economic diversification (Losch et al. 2012).  
 In this context, and in order to secure the maximum impact, the primary target of public policy in this 
area should be the broad masses of farmers and family farms. They offer a great potential for the 
integration of young people, provided however that attention is paid to improved working conditions 
in order to make farming more attractive (Proctor & Lucchesi 2012, Sumberg et al. 2012). 
Agricultural development in other parts of the world demonstrated the true capacity of family farms 
when they received the necessary support. A recent comparison between African, Brazilian and Thai 
agriculture - whose successes are undisputed, despite very different contexts - have shown that 
African farming operations would be competitive just as soon as the recurring obstacles of supply and 
marketing are removed. If the image of the "sleeping giant" (World Bank 2009) hardly corresponds to 
the reality of rural Africa, which is in the throes of profound changes, supporting this "struggling 
giant" constrained by today's sluggish environment will allow for margins of considerable progress to 
emerge.  
 
 If the answer to the challenge of employment requires reinvesting in development strategies, resulting 
directly in significantly improved knowledge of rural realities, which are largely restructured and 
largely unknown to existing information systems, then these strategies will also need to reclaim a 
territorial dimension: the space occupied by economic actors and African households, over which 
there is increasing exchange between the rural and the urban in daily life. This dimension, which has 
long been abandoned in favour of segmented approaches - thematic and sectoral - appears to be the 
appropriate level at which to consider future possibilities and seize the potential for innovation. 
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